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In this paper, we provide an overview of fingerprint sensing methods used for authentication. We analyze 
the current fingerprint sensing technologies, from algorithmic, as well as from hardware perspectives. We 
then focus on methods to detect physical liveness, defined as techniques that can be used to ensure that 
a living human user is attempting to authenticate on a system. We analyze how effective these methods 
are at preventing attacks where a malicious entity tries to trick a fingerprint-based authentication system to 
accept a fake finger as a real one (spoofing attacks). We then identify broader attack points against 
biometric data, such as fingerprints. Finally, we propose novel measures to protect fingerprint data. 
Introduction 
 
Fingerprint sensing in consumer products is a ubiquitous technology. While the first major 
consumer product to include a finger-print sensor appeared on the market less than eight years 
ago (iPhone5S, launched in October 2013), it is projected that in 2020. there will be over 1 billion 
smart devices with fingerprint sensors.1 
Today, fingerprint sensors are mainly used for authentication, as an alternative, or in addition to 
alpha-numerical passwords on a variety of mobile and smart devices. The drawback to the current 
finger-print-based authentication, however, is the fact that many existing systems are vulnerable 
to spoofing attacks, where an attacker tricks an authentication system to accept a fake fingerprint 
as a real one.2 
Many successful spoofing attacks require only a minimal effort, for example an image, or a 3D 
model of a finger.2 To make matters worse, it is relatively easy for a determined attacker to obtain 
victims’ fingerprints, for example from a high resolution photograph of a finger, or even from 
fingerprints left on a device itself.3   
Preventing spoofing attacks on fingerprint-based authentication systems has been an active 
research topic, and different approaches have been proposed, e.g., 4. One of the proposed 
approaches is known as the liveness detection, and it involves detecting whether a live finger 
is being scanned on the device, as opposed to an image or artificial model of a finger.  
In this paper, we present the current state of the art of the fingerprint-based authentication. We 
then analyze various existing and upcoming liveness detection methods, and investigate their 
potential for effective prevention of spoofing attacks. We further broaden our security analysis to 
a fingerprint-based authentication system as a whole, and identify several new possible 
vulnerabilities, and attack vectors against fingerprint data. In doing so, we focus on the flow of 
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biometric data within the system, and analyze an impact that each point of compromise would 
have on a system as a whole, as well as on the biometric data, as a mean of authentication. In 
doing so, we analyze three new families of attacks against fingerprint-based authentication 
systems. Lastly, we propose a set of recommendation to prevent and mitigate the identified 
attacks. We note that, while we focus on mobile devices, and consumer platforms as a use case, 
this work is applicable to all platforms, using finger-print-sensing technology for authentication. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to present the state of the art of fingerprint sensing 
methods, as well as anti-spoofing and liveness detection methods, which can be used 
concurrently with these methods. This paper aims to provide a novel, secure and holistic approach 
to the design of a fingerprint-based biometric system; including sensor selection, anti-spoofing 
and liveness detection defense strategies, and comprehensive information flow considerations 
through the system. 
System Security Context 
System 
In this paper, our systems of interest are mobile and smart devices. Such systems usually 
have a camera, a microphone, wireless connectivity (usually both Wi-Fi and cellular), and 
they are typically connected to various cloud resources, such as social networks and 
financial services. In order to assure that only a device owner (and/or an authorized user) 
has access to the device’s resources, the device is typically locked, and can be unlocked 
only by an authorized user. On a device equipped with a fingerprint sensor, such a sensor 
allows an authorized user to gain access to the system without having to type in a 
password.  
Assets 
Providing access to a large number of resources and services, mobile devices are 
increasingly being considered personal and sensitive. As such, they consist of large 
amounts of information that a user is likely to want to protect. In many instances, such 
sensitive data may include: address book of contacts, emails, instant messaging history, 
pictures, location in-formation, users’ activity and health information, users’ financial 
information, as well as their purchasing history. 
In addition, many users of mobile devices have mobile phone payment systems setup on 
their devices. These services provide an easy and convenient way to directly extract 
money from a compromised phone. 
Lastly, under specific circumstances, a user might also care about protecting the 
bandwidth available to the smart device, its IP and MAC addresses, information about 
private network access, as well as computing resources of the device itself, as those 
could all be leveraged for a variety of nefarious purposes. 
Attackers 
With such a wide range of assets to protect, there are a number of curious, or malicious 
entities that may want to attack the system. Based on the potential harm that they are 
likely to cause, those attackers can be grouped into personal acquaintances, criminals, 
and potentially state actors. While personal acquaintance may be interested in 
snooping through someone’s private information (for example, social media accounts, 
messages and potentially, photographs), an access to the data stored on a device may 
allow criminals to blackmail a user, steal their financial assets, or even their identity. 
A necessary requirement to prevent many of these attacks is user authentication, and 
one, frequently used, way to do so is fingerprint-based biometric authentication, which we 
discuss in the next Section. 
Fingerprint-based Authentication 
All fingerprint sensor technologies rely, at least partially, on imaging the surface features 
of the human finger. It is known that the surface features of a human figure become 
permanent by the 16th week of pregnancy, and that those features are unique to an 
individual.5 The unique features of the fingerprint minutia can be divided into three main 
categories:6 
• Level 1 features focus on the global pattern of the minutiae. These features are 
broadly characterized as arch, loop and whorl.  
• Level 2 features contain the ridges and values that make up the minutiae. The 
minutiae have unique features such as bifurcations or abrupt endings.  
• Level 3 features are all features that appear intra ridge. These include small 
details, such as sweat pores or warts/scars that deform the ridge shapes.   
Most fingerprint-based algorithms authenticate an individual by identifying and matching 
their unique features. In doing so, the algorithms rely on two facts: the persistence of 
fingerprints – the fingerprints do not change over a person’s lifetime (other than through 
external damage), and the uniqueness of fingerprints.6   
Fingerprint Matching Algorithms 
Research and development of fingerprint matching algorithms have been a prolific 
research area, both in academia (see, e.g.,7, 8), and in consumer-based industries such 
as cellphones, computers and payment terminals.  
Broadly speaking, a fingerprint matching algorithm operates by focusing on, and matching 
various properties of a fingerprint. Some example algorithms include: minutia matching, 
where the focus is on the level 2 features of a fingerprint,7 ridge flow maps, where the 
focus is on extracting curves that correspond to the level 1 features of the fingerprint,8 
and ridge wavelengths gradients, where the focus in on assessing the ridge-to-ridge or 
ridge-to-valley spacing and orientation.9 Each of these techniques can be used on their 
own, or in conjunction with each other. New algorithms continue to be developed to 
improve sensor performance, to overcome the limited minutia detail present on poor 
scans or small area sensors. The goal of all these techniques is to transform an arbitrary 
grey-scale image into some abstract form that allows for numerical comparison. The 
algorithm then sets a threshold for how stringent acceptance and rejection criteria should 
be, based on the features that it is monitoring.        
The performance of a general authentication system is typically characterized by a False 
Acceptance Rate (FAR) and a False Rejection Rate (FRR). The FAR is a measure of 
how often an attacker is able to authenticate on the system because his/her fingerprint is 
similar enough to the users. The FRR represents a measure of how often a valid user 
must make multiple authentication attempts in order for the system to authenticate them. 
The FRR being high is a result of the system, and how the user interacts with it. If a user 
presses too hard, or lifts their finger up too fast, that could lead an otherwise good login 
attempt to be rejected, because the image captured was not good enough for the system 
to process. A low FRR ensures a good user experience.  
The FAR and FRR present a natural tradeoff, as increasing security may make it more 
difficult for users to log in, while making the system too liberal with authentication attempts 
may reduce security. Sometimes both of these are reported as a single Equal Error Rate 
(EER) statistic. This number represents a point where the proportion of false matches is 
the same as the proportion of false non-matches and can be used as a single figure of 
merit to compare solutions. 
Figure 1 (FAR vs. FRR) shows the distribution for the FAR and FRR cumulative 
distribution functions of a theoretical system. It can be seen from the image how selecting 
a certain threshold on the x-axis will result in different FAR and FRR performance of the 
system. Setting the threshold low will result in a low FRR, and a great user experience, 
but will compromise security. Setting a high threshold will result in a high security, but 
may become unusable in real world scenarios. A tradeoff between security and user 
experience will need to be set according to the intended application. 
 
 
Figure 1: FAR vs FRR - Selecting a certain threshold on the x-axis, will result in different FAR and FRR performance of the system 
 
Physical Mechanisms of Fingerprint Detection 
An important component of every fingerprint-based authentication system is a physical 
mechanism used to read a fingerprint. Based on the physical properties, we distinguish 
between four possible mechanisms: 
• Optical mechanism, 
• Capacitive mechanism 
• Thermal mechanism, and 
• Ultrasonic mechanism 
 
Optical Mechanisms 
Optical fingerprint sensors are perhaps the oldest technology in this space. This category 
covers various Charge-Coupled Device (CCD) and CMOS implementations that capture 
the raw fingerprint image using a camera type sensor. These implementations typically 
rely on a prism that is flooded with diffused light. The light allows a sensor to capture an 
image of the fingerprint ridges.   
The main advantage of these sensors comes from their ability to work through a thick 
mechanical stack-up above the sensing surface. This allows them to be implemented 
under cover glass on portable devices where other sensors cannot be used. Optical 
sensors, how-ever, suffer from multiple drawbacks. Older models struggle with detecting 
depth information and can be easy to spoof. The mechanical complexity of the optical 
assembly makes them space-prohibitive in many consumer electronics. These sensors 
also require significant height, as reducing the space between the prism and a sensor 
would introduce too much optical distortion.10 
 
Capacitive Mechanisms 
Capacitive fingerprint sensors create an image of a fingerprint using the difference in 
capacitive coupling between the ridges and grooves of the skin. The benefit of this 
technology is that it does not require lenses, cameras, or an optical system, which allows 
it to be smaller than a traditional optical fingerprint scanner. Some drawbacks of 
capacitive technology are: the limits of dielectric constant and structure for materials that 
can be put over the sensor and still produce a good image, cost of large silicon area, and 
Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) vulnerability. This limits the thickness of protective material 
coatings that can be used and potential placements for these sensors. 
There are two types of capacitive fingerprint sensing: passive and active. 
Passive capacitive fingerprint sensor 
The passive method (also called a direct method) of capacitive fingerprint sensing uses 
an open-ended circuit where a capacitive plate is exposed on the sensor surface, and the 
capacitance is continuously measured by a circuit. When the dielectric constant of skin is 
sensed to be present, due to the change in capacitance, the outline of the skin ridges can 
be detected. 
Active capacitive fingerprint sensor 
An active capacitive fingerprint sensor conducts low frequency RF energy into the skin 
and receives the signal in each of the capacitive elements, such that a closed loop circuit 
is formed. The sensors are composed of an array of sensing plates that can detect this 
signal when it is coupled through the skin into the sensor. Typically, this approach is more 
sensitive than the passive method but requires additional circuitry to work.  
 
Thermal Mechanisms 
Thermal fingerprint sensors have been proposed as a lower cost, and more robust 
alternative to capacitive sensors. The operating principle is using materials that convert 
changes in temperature to a voltage.  
One issue in general with thermal measurement methods is that the temperature quickly 
equalizes between ridges and grooves of the finger once applied to the sensor, which 
means that the thermal image is only available for a short period of time, and quickly 
disappears. This makes passive thermal imaging infeasible. However, a voltage signal 
can be applied to the thermo-junction, and a temperature signal can be generated which 
heats up and cools off dependent on the heat capacity of the material contacting it. This 
allows an image of a fingerprint to be sensed. Because it requires active heating, the 
temperature-based fingerprint sensor has higher power requirements than capacitive 
sensors. 
 
Ultrasonic Mechanisms 
One of the newest and most promising technologies emerging in the fingerprint sensor 
space are ultrasonic micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) type sensors.11 These 
sensors rely on array of microsismic sensors similar to those employed in the ultrasound 
medical industry. These transducers work as both the receiver and transmitter of the 
signal. First a pulse is sent out, and then the sensors monitor their own mechanical 
deformation to determine the mechanical properties of the material placed on them. The 
resonant frequency of each “pixel” is affected by being highly damped when a ridge is 
pressed or being undamped when the air from a valley is present. With multiple images 
and various image processing techniques these sensors are able to build a 3-D image of 
the finger. In addition to relying on the surface minutia additional biometric markers from 
the dermis, such as vein structure can be added to the model. This makes this type of 
sensor particularly difficult to spoof as any artifact used would need to have detailed 
reproductions of the internals of a victim’s finger.11 
Spoofing Attacks and Prevention Through Liveness Detection 
While convenient to use, many of the existing fingerprint-based authentication system are 
vulnerable to spoofing attacks, where an attacker tricks an authentication system to 
accept a fake fingerprint as a real one.2 
To prevent an onslaught of spoofing attacks, many fingerprint-based authentication 
methods additionally employ liveness detection. Liveness detection refers to any 
technique that can be used to ensure that a true, living human user is attempting to 
authenticate on the system.12 Several such methods are currently being used in 
consumer devices, and many more are under development. In the rest of this section, we 
provide an overview of several such liveness detection methods.  
 
Skin Temperature Detection 
One of the simplest (and minimal effort) ways to detect liveness is by sensing the 
temperature of the finger. While being low-cost and easy to implement, this detection 
method is also easy to bypass by simply warming up the fake finger to body temperature. 
Due to the possible variation in temperature between different people’s fingertips, 
including in cold weather, the limits cannot be too stringent. However, temperature 
detection can be an additional easy check to help augment a more comprehensive 
liveness detection system. 
 
Heartbeat Detection 
Another simple method to detect a spoofing attack against a fingerprint-based 
authentication system is to check for the presence of a heartbeat. If no heartbeat is 
present, or if an unrealistic value is obtained, the authentication attempt can be ruled out 
as a spoof. One way to detect a heartbeat can be achieved by measuring the amount of 
light that is transmit-ted through a finger. In doing so, we rely on the fact that hemoglobin 
has a differential absorbance, at particular wavelengths, as a function of its oxygen 
saturation.12 By monitoring the change in the absorption, an estimate of the heartbeat can 
be obtained.   
 
Finger Translucence 
Live tissue within the finger has the capability of passing light of certain wavelengths in a 
characteristic way, while partially filtering out other wavelengths. Relying on that fact, an-
other method of liveness detection uses a white LED to shine light into the finger at one 
location, then uses one or more photodiodes to detect light spectrum passed through the 
finger to another location. A fake finger may be opaque and not pass any light, or it may 
pass all wavelengths of light equally or in a way that a live finger would not.  
 
Skin Impedance 
Measuring the resistance of skin has also been investigated as a means of liveness 
detection. Various factors including humidity and moisture of the finger affect the surface 
resistance, leading to quite a wide range of potential resistances.13 The impedance can 
also be measured at frequencies above DC. In general, this can be useful as a secondary 
means of liveness detection at best, due to the wide range of possible impedances 
between individuals and environmental conditions. 
 
Skin Perspiration Patterns 
The way in which perspiration can indicate the presence of a live finger has also been 
studied as a way to detect liveness.14 This method is based on the observed phenomena 
of perspiration traveling along finger ridges, starting from skin pores and extending 
outwards over time. This change over time (for example, over a period of 2 seconds) is 
only present in live humans, and not cadavers or spoofed fingerprints. 
Furthermore, the perspiration pattern is unique to an individual’s finger, and is determined 
by the location of sweat pores and surface texture of the finger. This is intriguing because 
not only can it function as a general detection of liveness, but it may also have the 
potential to be another signal to help identify individuals as well, with the added benefit 
that it may not be easy to forensically get this marker from fingerprints left on surfaces. 
 
Skin Deformation on Touch 
Human flesh has multiple characteristics that are intrinsic to it, such as tensile strength, 
tensile strain, compressive strength, shear strain and hardness.15 By taking multiple 
images during an authentication attempt, these properties can be estimated from the 
images obtained. If graphical analysis is not in line with nominal human values, the sensor 
can reject the login attempt. Other approaches focus on obtaining even more proactive 
measurements of the mechanical properties of the finger. By forcing the user to rotate the 
finger or move it about on the surface of the sensor, a more precise estimate of the 
mechanical properties can be made.15 This method is particularly interesting because it 
works with any of the aforementioned fingerprint sensing technologies, and it would only 
require that the manufacturer characterizes nominal mechanical properties for human 
fingers on their sensors. The drawback of this approach, however, is that it requires fast 
sensors and processors to take multiple good images during a short login press. 
Alternatively forcing the user to rotate their fin-ger during device usage could be seen as 
unacceptable from an experience standpoint.   
 
Internal Imaging of Dermis 
One of the primary advantages of ultrasonic sensors is the ability to image beyond the 
top layer of the epidermis. The skin on a finger is a complicated organ that contains 
several layers. The use of ultrasonic transducers allows the sensor to image these 
internal layers as well as vein/capillary structures and bone structure. The combination of 
these internal fingerprint characteristics makes a spoof nearly impossible to reproduce, 
as it would require a nearly perfect model of the victim’s finger.    
 
Summary of fingerprint sensing methods, and liveness detection techniques 
With respect to their ability to detect a spoofed finger, we classify liveness detection 
methods into three categories: 
• Low security methods, 
• Medium security methods, and 
• High security methods, 
where a low security method refers to a method that can be easily tricked to accept a 
spoofed finger and a high security method refers to method that would require a 
substantial amount of skill and effort from an attacker 
Our results are summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Relative security of various liveness detection methods 
Low security 
Skin temperature 
Skin impedance 
Medium security 
Heartbeat detection 
Finger translucence 
Skin deformation 
High security 
Skin perspiration detection 
Internal imaging of capillaries 
 
As a general recommendation, we see capacitive fingerprint sensing method, with 
perspiration-based liveness detection, and ultrasonic sensing with capillary imaging-
based liveness detection as two attractive combinations of fingerprint sensing and 
liveness detection technologies. We believe that these methods could improve the 
security by preventing finger-print-spoofing attacks in consumer devices without a 
negative impact on the devices’ price point. 
 
Broader Analysis of Attacks Against Biometric-Based Authentication 
One of the features of many biometric-based authentication methods, such as fingerprint 
sensors, is the fact that every person’s fingerprint is unique and permanent, and as such 
cannot be reissued or updated, if they ever get compromised. This feature effectively 
means that protecting biometric data, during the collection phase, as well as during the 
authentication phase is a critical task. Compromised fingerprint data would lead to a 
compromise of that specific authentication system, but also to a compromise of all existing 
and future systems that do (would) rely on the fingerprint data for authentication.  
These unique challenges of fingerprint data; the critical need to protect fingerprint data, 
and the difficulty of protecting the data using traditional cryptographic methods, require 
careful consideration. We start this process by observing that every fingerprint-based 
authentication system has a specific information flow, consisting of three phases: 
• Enrollment phase – a process during which a user of the system allows their 
fingerprint data, referred to as a fingerprint template, to be collected, and stored 
by the system. This step typically occurs only once. 
• Storage phase – all times during which the collected data is not being used. 
• Authentication phase – a process during which the stored fingerprint template 
is compared with the fingerprint data collected at that moment, in order to 
identify, and authenticate the user. 
We focus on each of the defined steps of the information flow (enrollment, storage and 
authentication), and recognize that those phases can be targeted by specific attacks, as 
depicted in Figure 2 (Attacker Model):  
 
1. Physical attacks,  
2. Sensor-to-host Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks,  
3. Host-to-Server MitM attacks, and  
4. Local and remote attacks.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Attacker model 
Note: in this paper, we focus on data obtained using fingerprint sensors, but the 
challenges discussed here apply equally to other forms of biometric authentication that 
rely on data recorded during the enrollment phase, and later used for authentication.   
Starting from the assumption that the best security practices have been followed in 
ensuring physical security of a fingerprint sensor, as well as of a smart (mobile) device, 
and the potential cloud storage, in the rest of the section we focus on attack classes (2)-
(4). 
 
Sensor-to-Host Man in the Middle  
The first attack vector we consider is a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack, mounted against 
the data en route between the sensor and the host processor. These attacks become 
feasible by physically compromising the data bus, or by picking up (eavesdropping on) 
the wireless communication on the bus. The first step to avoiding this class of attacks is 
encrypting the communication between the host and the sensor, in order to ensure that 
the fingerprint data is never passed in plaintext, and not compromised (neither during 
enrollment, nor during authentication phases).  If the device is monolithic, this can be 
achieved in the factory by providing a secret session key to both endpoints during 
manufacture. If this is not possible, or the system is modular, a TLS or similar type of 
scheme can be used. An asymmetric key encryption algorithm can be used to establish 
a session key, and then a symmetric key algorithm can be used to encrypt the data.  
 
Host-to-Server Man in the Middle  
The second opportunity for a MitM attack is between the host and any external resources, 
such as a cloud server, where the fingerprint data may be stored. These types of attack 
can be carried out by intercepting traffic between two endpoints. A form of encryption and 
authentication is required to ensure that communication is not compromised. The Fast 
Identity Online Alliance (FIDO) is a non-profit organization that has codified a consistent 
way that biometric credentials can be shared across the internet. FIDO provides a 
password-less, and second factor authentication user experience. On the user end of the 
system, users are able to use their fingerprint sensor without any additional steps. In the 
background, however, FIDO uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm, and locally on the 
host, associates bio-metric authentication with the release of a public key to the remote 
resource. Challenges are passed using the private key to establish a secure session. 
 
Local and Remote Host Attacks 
In both local and remote attacks, an attacker’s goal is to load malware onto the system, 
in order to gain access to privileged information. In doing so, an attacker can gain a 
privileged access to system memory, or they can again intercept outgoing/incoming data 
transmissions.  
Local host attacks would require the attacker to somehow manipulate the host, so as to 
load malware on to it. One of the easiest, and most common methods would be through 
an USB port. Remote host attacks, on the other hand, would use a different vector to load 
malware on to the system. This would be achieved with phishing, infected peer-to-peer 
clients, infected emails, or even through social engineering.  
There exist many widely known techniques to achieve the malicious goals. An attack, 
such as PoisonTap through a fake USB device, could forward outgoing Ethernet data to 
the at-tacker. A remote attack, such as row hammering, could potentially gain access to 
system memory.  
The best way to prevent and mitigate these attacks is to implement a solution that stores 
the fingerprint templates, as well as incoming sensor data in a Trusted Execution 
Environment (TEE). One such approach is the Intel SXG enclave environment, which 
ensures that the system remains protected even when the BIOS, VMM, OS, and drivers 
are compromised. In mobile environments that use ARM based processors, the ARM® 
TrustZone® is able to achieve a similar goal. 
 
Discussion: Template Storage Design Choices 
The applications for fingerprint sensors, and biometric data as a whole are increasingly 
being used in a variety of applications. This is evident in the implementation of biometric 
passports, biometric driver’s licenses, as well as in a variety of commercial applications, 
all of which rely on fingerprint data for authentication. This shift in a paradigm will leave 
designers and system architects with a variety of options, that may have non-trivial, even 
serious consequences. In this paper, we assumed that the template information is stored 
in secure memory on the host device, but such an approach may not be preferable, 
or even feasible in certain applications.  
On one end of the spectrum, the template database could be implemented on the sensor 
silicon itself. In this scenario, only a pass or fail bit would need to be sent to the host, 
ensuring that even a compromised host would never leak private biometric data. The 
downside of this approach is that such a system would require an additional embedded 
storage, and computing resources on the sensor, which would come at additional cost, 
and likely per-form worse than the comprehensive resources available on a typical host 
system. An alternative approach altogether could see the template data stored in the 
cloud, or on remote servers. Such an approach could allow for a user to access multiple 
devices, or terminals on the same domain without having to explicitly enroll on each 
device. This can have usability advantages in settings where many users access and 
share public resources, for example, meeting rooms with smart boards or computer-
controlled projectors. This approach, however, adds important security questions to the 
system. For example: 
• Would users trust third parties, e.g., employers, to store and protect their 
biometric data?   
• Will sensor manufacturing variation allow for an enroll template made on one 
sensor to authenticate on another copy of the same sensor?  
• Would such templates be comprehensive enough to be used across different 
sensors from different manufacturers? 
The reality is that the implementation of the template data storage is left to the creator of 
the biometric algorithms. The end user does not know where and how is their data being 
stored.  
In the best-case scenario, users’ data would be stored in a format abstracted and 
obfuscated enough to make it unusable for an attacker able to compromise template 
database. In the worst-case scenario, the data may end up being stored with enough 
detailed information to create a spoof if the database is com-promised. As discussed 
earlier, that represents a critical problem for fingerprint-based authentication system, 
because once the fingerprint template is compromised, it may compromise all other 
systems as well. 
Aside from that security concern, biometric data can provide sensitive information about 
a user, such as information about their gender or race. These concerns raise additional 
questions: do possible privacy challenges imply that biometric data requires an even more 
stringent protection? Moreover, should developers be under a legal obligation to disclose 
to the end user how the biometric data is stored, and how it is processed in their 
algorithms?  
Conclusion 
Fingerprint sensing is rather ubiquitous in consumer and mobile device space as a way 
to authenticate users (in lieu, or in addition to alphanumerical passwords). Fingerprint 
sensors of today, however, are susceptible to a variety of possible attack vectors. One of 
the easiest, and most prevalent attacks against fingerprint sensors is a fingerprint 
spoofing attack. In this attack, fake fingers, 3D models of fingerprints, or potentially even 
a severed finger are used to trick an authentication system into accepting a malicious 
entity as a valid user. The next generation of fingerprint-enabled devices will likely include 
robust liveness detection methods as a way to prevent such spoofing attacks.  
In this paper, we present a state-of-the-are review of the existing fingerprint sensing 
method, used in the modern-day consumer devices. We then provide a detailed analysis 
of existing, and upcoming liveness detection methods. In doing so, we observe that most 
liveness detection methods will deter, and stop opportunistic criminals, but may fail at 
stopping a determined attacker. There do, however, exist several liveness methods that 
would be hard to bypass or compromise, regardless of an attacker’s effort. The two most 
promising methods are internal capillary imaging and ultrasonic based sensors.  
Widening our analysis of possible attacks against fingerprint-based authentication 
methods, we next make two important observations; that fingerprint data are unique and 
permanently tied to a user, but their samples (slightly) vary from one measurement to 
another. These two observations make the needed to protect the biometric data critical 
for the security of all fingerprint-based authentication systems. At the same time, these 
observations render many of the traditional security (cryptographic) methods of protecting 
data infeasible. 
Focusing on the flow of information in a typical biometric-based authentication system, 
we next identify several new families of attack vectors. We analyze each of these families, 
and make recommendation as to how to protect the biometric data during each of the 
phases of information flow. 
A broader goal of our paper is to emphasize the importance of protecting biometric data, 
especially in the consumer space. While in this paper, we focus on the fingerprint data, 
many of the issues raised translate to other biometric data as well. Their unique, and 
permanent tie to a user makes the need to protect such data critical, and not just from the 
security standpoint, but also from privacy.  
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